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New U.S. space initiatives will require innovative technology to realize planned programs such as piloted
lunar and Mars mtss_ns. Key to the optimal execution of _uch missions are high performance orbt't
transfer vehicles and prol_iant storage faci_ties. Large amounts of liquid h3_togen and oxygen demand
a uniquely designed on_d_'t cryogenic propellant depot. Because of the intmr_t dangers in prqOellant
storage and hamaing a compretxonMve system safety program must be established. This paper shows
how the myriad and complex hazards demonstrate the need for an integrated safe_y effort to be applied
from program conception through olxoratlonai use. Even though the cryogenic depot is still in the
conceptual stage, many of the hazards have been identifie_ incluch'ng fatigue due to heaty thermal
loaxk'ng from environmental and operating temperature extremes, micrometeoroid and/or depot
anciaary equipment impact (this ts an important problem due to the large surface area needed to house
the la_e quantities of propellant), docking and maintenance hazards, and hazards associated u_th
extended extravehicular activity. Vattous safety analyM._ technklues u_re presented for each program
phase. Specific system safeO_ tmplonentation steps were also listed Enhanced risk assessment u_s
demonstrated through the incorporation of these methods.
DEVELOPING A SAFE ON-ORBIT
CRYOGENIC DEPOT
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
currently has new U.S. space initiatives to develop piloted lunar
and Mars missions. Central to these programs are orbital transfer
vehicles (Ol'Vs) and extensive cryogenic propellant storage
facilities operating in Earth's orbit. It is known from Stubbs et al.
(1987) that large quantities of cryogens, such as liquid hydrogen
and oxygen (on the order of 200,000 lb for geosynchronous Earth
traffic and 400,000 lb for lunar traffic), require the advancement
of on-orbit cryogenic propellant storage technology.
A NASA On-Orbit Cryogenic Depot Technology Task Force is
presently studying the various concepts. The definition stage is
sufficiently prefatorial that the exact purpose of the depot has yet
to be defined. Its primary function is to fuel OTVs. However,
secondary functions and modes of completing the primary
function have not been determined. Primary functions of the
depot will include propell_nt storage, acquisition, expulsion,
conditioning, refill, measurement and control, thermal control,
venting, data/communication, inspection and diagnostics, and
vehicle proximity operations. All these functions will demand
unique systems creation. Technology development requirements
for the depot must be identified and solved prior to fulLscale
deployment.
Several options have been proposed for the propellant depot
and maintenance facility. These include (1) a single OTV main-
tenance facility with refueling capability attached to the space
station, (2) a space-station-attached maintenance facility and
separate co-orbiting cryogenic propellant depot, and (3)a co-
orbiting OTV maintenance and propellant storage platform. The
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task force is currently strongly pursuing the second option, the
attached servicing facility with co-orbiting propellant depot.
Now is an opportune time to seriously develop a safe OTV
cryogenic depot. The inherent hazards of the above-mentioned
options are considerable. Even though the task force is studying
the second option more seriously than the others, a comprehen-
sive system safety effort must be expanded in tandem with
technology and trade studies.
Failures of the cryogenic propellant depot would not only affect
the facility operators, but may possibly damage the space station.
Loss of the depot would severely affect the mission and could
cancel the program, If all the fuel were lost at a critical path point,
new launch windows (for refueling both the depot and planetary
spacecraft) would have to be established. Questions regarding
man-tended (or partially man-tended) vs. automated operations
must be addressed. The proximity of the depot to the space
station is of critical importance. The magnitude of an explosion
of 200,000 lb of liquid hydrogen and oxygen could directly affect
the space station.
There are numerous depot configuration trades that must be
analyzed. One such issue that has been suggested is the utilization
of tethers to facilitate and simplify propellant transfers. However,
the safety implications are profound; the less automated the
system, the greater the human risk. Engineering optimization is
fundamental to realizing an efficient and cost-effective system.
Another important issue is growth potential, which is key to
expanding NASA's dynamic mission capabilities. This well
illustrates the need for continual system safety analysis. Any small
change in this complex system could negatively affect the system.
Safety trade-offs for efficacious operations will not enhance the
overall and continual use of the depot. Because hazards may not
be readily apparent, an ongoing safety effort is needed to bring
problem areas to light. The results of a serious risk assessment
will positively contribute to a viable technology trade-off decision.
The purpose of this paper is to show how and where system safety
can be applied to develop a safe cryogenic depot.
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SYSTEMS LIFE CYCLE OF THE
CRYOGENIC DEIK)T
The essential factor in gove_ a :congruous safety effort is
to be intimately involved in the entire cryogenic depot program.
The way for system safety to become an integral member, from
conception through deployment, is to participate as a working
member (with equal status and voice) in the following program
phases: (1) concept; (2) definition (flight experiment definition
and analytical models development); (3)development (path-
finder, technology demonstrator design and testing, prototype
hardware design and testing, and final development); (4)pro-
duction; (5)deployment (space transport system (STS) use and
depot amplification) (Fig. 1 ).
INTEGRATED SYSTEM SAFETY FOR THE
CRYOGENIC PROP_ DEPOT
Cryogenic Depot Technology Requirements
Various planned programs impel the cryogenic depot develop-
ment. The significant mission drivers are manned Mars, manned
lunar, robotics exploration, and planet Earth (Ride, 1987). These
drivers have various technology requirements.
Technology requirements are abundant and fall into general
categories of fluid storage, supply, handling, and transfer; advanced
instrumentation; and materials and structures. A partial listing of
technology requirements identified to date includes cryogenic
fluid resupply; reusable Earth-to-orbit cryogen transport; long-term
orbital cryogen storage; control, instrumentation, and diagnostics;
fluid thermodynamic analytical models (chilldown, vapor liquefi-
cation, vent characterization, etc.); pressure control techniques
for long-term storage; zero-gravity fluid quantity gauging; mass
measurement accuracy (expulsion and refill); quick disconnect;
fluid leak olxa'atious/detection; fluid venting/dumping; thermody-
namic vent; refi'igeration requirements; fluid motion effects on
controls; pretransfer conditioning of receiver vessel (chilldown,
ventdown, purge, etc.); nonvented receiver refill; transfer line
conditioning; storage loss reduction; and material development
( Stubbs et al., 1987).
Many of these technology development requirements are high
risk, both in terms of technology payoff and system safety signif-
icance. Many must be demonstrated in orbit since the technol-
ogies and analytical models cannot be validated in Earth's gravity.
Each one of the requirements has a potent system safety
implication. Only through a well-defined and integrated system
safety effort tan the issues be appropriately understood.
Technology Development
To safely develop the appropriate technology, program con-
siderations should be analyzed. NASA has identified three main
technology considerations that must be addressed: mission, manu-
facturing, and performance (Dav/s et al., 1970). System safety
studies should be conducted for all of them. System concerns are
discussed below.
1. Develop systemsafetyplan
2, Conduct hazardanalysis
3. Define safetydesign
requirements
4. Conduct failure analysis
5. Conduct risk analysis
6. Conduct safety test
7. Conduct safetytraining
Concept
Initial
PHA
Initial
Historical datareview
Preliminary risk
assessment
Definition
Final
PHA/FTA
Final
Historicaldata review
Update riskassessmentas new
material becomes available
Flight definition testsand path finder
tests
O_
FMEA/OSHA/FTA
Final
Test results
Updaterisk assessmentas new material
becomes available
Pathfinder/technology demonstratorand
prototype hardware
Support
Production
OSHA
Update database
Update riskassessmentas new material
becomes available
Hardware qualificationtests
Monitor
Update hazard analyses
Updatedatabase
Updaterisk assessmentas new material
becomes available
Monitor
Fill. t. System safety tasks. S_fety tests should be both ground- and on-orbit tests. PHA: Preliminary Hazard Analysis; FTA: Fault Tree Analysis; FMEA: Fail-
ure Mode and Effect Analysis; OSHA: Operating and Support Hazard Analysis. From Roland and M_arty (1983).
Bahr: On-orbit cryogenic depot 97
Mission consideration.*.
Operational pressure: Cryogens may be stored as single phase
(supercritical) or two phase (subscritical). It appears that NASA
is supporting the subcritical storage system over the supercritical.
Quantity measurement: The acctwacy of quantity is paramount
for operational use and system diagnostics. Quantity measurement
with a subcritical system is much more difficult than with a
supercritical system; the liquid-vapor mixture involves a more
complex measurement media. NASA is currently developing
subcritical cryogen (for anhydrous ammonia) measuring devices
for the space station.
Pressure control: A subcritical system may undergo pressure
instabilities (including boilofO. If the depot is hard-fixed to the
space station, vapor releases may cause small perturbations, affect-
ing space station experiments and possibly polluting the outer
skin of the station. Thermal stratification also may affect pressure
control.
Manufacturing conslderattomg
Reproducibility: Manufacturing repeatability and accuracy for
system operation is critical for mission success.
Shelf life: The depot has a designated shelf life of 10 to 20 years.
Weight: Launch costs and weight, especially for a 200,000-1b to
400,000-1b fluid, dictate optimal design.
Materials: They must be compatible with the environment (of
both deep space and the fluid media itself) and have high
strength-to-weight ratios. Some of the major material concerns are
fracture toughness, fatigue properties, chemical properties, perme-
ation, creep properties, embrittlement, and joint efficiency.
Envelope constraints: Depot (whether attached, tethered, or
completely autonomous to the space station) interfacing mech-
anisms will influence the physical and structural design para-
meters.
Performance considerations.
StanaDy time: The dormant period between use and nonuse
is important. Cryogen residue in the line can vaporize and cause
a pressure barrier when fuel is extracted in the next run.
Fluid quantity: The quantity cannot be accurately determined
until the depot purpose has been more clearly delineated.
Power requ/mments: Power requirements for pumps, fans, and
diagnostics, are contingent on fluid usage requirements.
Environmental conck'tions: Temperature variations, due to
thermal cycling, will significantly affect thermal and thermody-
nan'tic design. Micrometeoroid and space debris impact also are
important for design.
METHODOLOGY FOR SYSTEM SAFETY
To fully support each phase of the system life cycle, various
system safety techniques can be exploited. Most of these methods
should be used for every serious technology option. The choice
of system safety analysis depends on the program phase and level
of developmental detail. Each one of the methods has been
successfully proven on numerous NASA, Department of Energy,
Department of Defense, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission pro-
jects. The most common methods are listed below with a brief
description of each safety tool and program phase application. It
is not within the scope of this paper to go into in-depth expla-
nations of each analysis technique.
Preliminary mazar0 Analysis (PHA)
The PHA is me base-line document for the integrated system
safety effort. The word "preliminary" denotes first hazard search
of the system. The analysis addresses the major hazards of the
system and allows early tracking of problem areas. The initial PHA
is not to affect control of the hazard (this will come later in the
program life cycle with other techniques), but rather to provide
management with knowledge of potential risks for feasibility
studies and program definition activities. Tradeoff studies are
greatly enhanced with the hazard identification method of the
PHA, allowing establishment of design and procedural require-
ments, to eliminate or control hazardous conditions before the
system becomes so advanced that design changes become
prohibitive in terms of cost. The PHA is most frequently used
during the concept and definition program phases.
Subsystem/System Hazard Analysis (SSHA/SHA)
The SHA (the format and use are exactly the same for the
SSHA) is an inductive method of analysis. Interest is focused on
system-level design features that may affect overall performance
or safety. Special interest is concentrated on interface consider-
ations. System information is then used for the integration of the
full system hazard analysis. The analysis is usually conducted
during system definition and development phases.
Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA)
The focus of the OSHA is on system operation. Analysis empha-
sizes human factors engineering and operating conditions. Areas
considered are use of safety guards or devices, special procedures
or training, and identification of timing of operations or functions
and other ergonomic concerns. The OSHA should be initiated
early enough in system development for technical input. However,
the technique is very useful in the development phase as an
overall safety verification.
Fault Tree Analysis (ERA)
The FTA is a powerful deductive analytical tool. The method
employs a Boolean logic model that mimics the relationship
between events in a system. The final outcome is called the top
event. Even though the method is called fault tree, the top event
may be either a desired or undesired outcome. This safety and
reliabifity tool is very useful in the early design phases and in
studying operational systems. The output may be of a quantitative
or qualitative nature, depending on the input information.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
The FMEA is sometimes called a failure mode and effects and
criticality analysis (FMECA). Though this is primarily a reliability
tool, the analysis does furnish much useful information. The FMEA
focuses on single-point and piece-part failures and their prop-
agation effects through the system. The technique tends to
concentrate primarily on component failure instead of human
error.
Other tools frequently used in system safety are change analysis,
human factors analysis, common cause failure analysis, training,
audits, and mishap investigations.
Because the PHA, OSHA, and SHA are all very similar, flequently
they are grouped into a comprehensive hazard analysis. This
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would require that the hazard analysis be updated at program
milestones to incorporate operational (and human factors) and
system hazards.
Sequence of Hazard Control
It is of importance to remember that risks always exist. The
only way to mitigate the hazards is to control them; the use of
the sequence of hazard control is the optimal method. The fol-
lowing are important in applying the sequence of hazard control
activities: design for acceptable hazard, use of safety devices, use
of warning devices, and finally, the use of procedures and training.
Design for an acceptable hazard means to minimize through
design methcxls the hazardous condition. For example, if heat is
an added hazard to loss of cryogen control, then one should try
to design without the need for external heating. Another example
is the use of separate quick disconnects for oxygen and hydrogen
cryogens. If incorrect mating is made impossible by separate,
incompatible disconnects, then the risk of mixing fluids by
incorrect connection is alleviated.
Safety devices are additions to the system to control the hazard.
The best example is a pressure relief _alve on a cryogen storage
vessel. The hazard of tank rupture is always there, but mitigated
through the relief system.
Warning devices are used to alert personnel and machinery to
impending danger or harm. The purpose of the warning device
is to prepare personnel and machinery for an emergency con-
tingency. Gas and leak detection devices are good examples of
this.
Procedures and training are the least successful of the sequence
elements. Because people are fallible, it is always best to try to
control the hazard by hardware design methods. People tend to
reach a 50% error rate during highly stressful situations. Even
though the operator may be well trained in transferring cryogens
to the OTV, the operator is unlikely to perform as well during
an emergency situation. The same weft-trained operator may also
fail during normal operations due to unforeseen stresses such as
personal problems, physical distances between operating devices,
unusual environmental conditions, tedious tasks, etc.
Risk Assessment Hierarchy
Risk analysis and control are the ultimate goals of system safety.
Various techniques, applied during different phases of the life
cycle, will achieve that goal. However, to adequately assess and
manage the risks, hazard severity and probability of occurrence
must be studied. Each of the analyses allows for hazard severity
and probability identification. When the hazard is identified, a
severity and probability is assigned. This permits one to classify
the hazard. A matrix gives an overall risk assessment code. The
decision maker now has something tangible to review for tra_re-
off studies or ,system changes.
It is best to to , to be quantitative whenever possible. However,
inaccurate or ambiguous numbers can lead to invalid risk as-
sessment. Probability numbers are easily attainable for series.
manufactured items or items with a large historical or scientific
database. To use quantitative probability analysis for state-of-the-
m hardware, in outer-envelope design conditions, is both mis-
leading and dangerous. Therefore, one is forced to assign a
qualitative designation for probability of occurrence. An example
of a qualitative risk matrix is shown in Table 1.
TABLE I. Risk assessment code (RAC) matrix.
Severity Class
Probability Estimate
A B C D
I 1 l 2 3
II 1 2 3 4
lIl 2 3 4 5
IV 3 4 5 6
RAC 1:
RAC 2:
RAC 3-6:
Severity CIassification=
I. Catastrophic
II. Critical
Ill. Marginal
Negligible
Considered imminent danger; requires immediate attention
and initiation of abatement procedures.
Considered serious and requires priority attention.
Considered nonserious; however, a priority ranking is estab-
lished for corrective measures.
May cause death or major system
destruction.
May cause severe injury, occupatiorta]
illness, or major property damage.
May cause minor injury, minor occupa-
tional illness, or minor property damage.
Probably would not affect personnel safety
or health, but is a violation of specific
criteria
Qualitative Probability
A. Likely to occur immediately.
B. Probably will occur in time.
C. May occur in time.
D. Unlikely to occur.
System Safety Implementation
In order to implement system safety into the program, it is
necessary to have a safety representative as a permanent member
of the task force. That person must not only have equal status
to the other members, but must also be a participantl The
representative will be charged with eng_g that all viable safety
concerns are addressed and acted upon. An integrated system
safety program is only useful if the system safety engineers have
adequate power to confirm that safety issues are not only
identified and resolved, but, more importantly, that controls are
put into place.
A system safety review panel, comprising technical experts,
should be established to review trade-off studies and decisions.
The knowledge and experience of technical experts at this
management level would be utilized to the fullest in order to
appropriately review system safety analyses. System reports will be
generated by the system safety engineers on each of the various
design, analysis, and development teams. The system safety
engineering reports emanating from this level must be highly
technical and comprehensive. To ensure adequate decision
making,_e review panel must be equally qualified.
The design, analysis__d development teams will have the most
knowledgeable engineers for a particular component, system, or
concept. If system safety engineers are not thoroughly integrated
on these teams, investigation and research decisions will be made
without adequate system safety engineering input.
Because an orbiting cryogenic depot is extremely complex,
safety is critical. Unfortunately, pertinent safety information is
lacking. The technology is sufl]dently new that a system safety
database has not been established. A special safety test program
and test bed may be required to validate trade studies and create
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the database. The primary purpose of this safety test program and
test bed would be to investigate safety implications of various
technologies in a highly structured and scientific manner. Num-
erous safety-related scenarios could be investigated before final
design acceptance. To provide a cost-effective safety test program,
the test bed need not be specially built. Many hazard potentials
could be researched in the same test beds as the actual chosen
hardware. Only certain destructive tests require remote facility
testing (i.e., at NASA White Sands Test Facility). Because of the
unique difficulties with zero gravity, some tests will need to be
conducted in orbit--not only flight definition tests, but also an
orbital subscale test bed (Schuster et ad., 1987).
Some Identified Top-Level Hazards of the Cryogenic Depot
Even though the OTV depot is still in the conceptual phase,
many generic hazards are readily apparent. A private-sector-
company PHA was conducted on various prephase A conceptual
alternatives (Aerospace Corporation, 1971). Some of those
hazards, along with other identified hazards, are fire/explosion,
environmental and thermal, mechanical (vibration shock/acous-
tic), pressure, impact, biological (toxicity), electrical, and human
factors (operations), and are discussed below. The generic
hazards can be divided into various groups. Please note that this
list will expand as the system is more clearly defined.
Fire and explosion are the most serious hazards. Improper
mating of oxygen and hydrogen systems, thus allowing the
incompatible fluids to mix, can cause an explosion. Another
hazard is the rupture, or leakage, of a common bulkhead oxygen
and hydrogen system. Because this system is being considered by
NASA, a trade study investigating the safety concerns of common
bulkhead vs. modular tank design would be interesting. A line or
disconnect rupture during transfer operations may release suf-
ficient propellant, causing a fire or explosion. In designing the
depot one must assure that ignition is eliminated by preventing
pneumatic impact on certain soft goods in oxygen lines.
The most obvious hazards are due to long-term environmental
effects. The probable life cycle of the depot will be 10 to 20 years.
During the entire life cycle, extreme thertnal conditions will affect
the depot. This creates heavy thermal loading and fatigue. There
are not only thermal cycling problems associated with the cryogen
(and its thermal stratification), but also the teml_rature variances
of space. It is obviously not convenient to have the depot receive
direct solar radiation. Space vacuum conditions will require care-
ful design. Long-term vacuum, thermal, and radiation degradation
of thermal coatings and mechanical components are significant
concerns. Material selection and design strategies will be a key
factor in confronting this problem. One probable temperature
variance concern is the growth and shrinkage of components.
Currently there are few data on the effects of large cryogenic
storage systems submitted to long-term space environments.
Because of the large surface areas required, coupled with the
vacuum environment, the area surrounding the storage facility
could be a major heat sink for the cryogen. Adequate insulation
around the storage tanks would be needed to prevent heat
transfer in either direction. Another possible problem would be
how noncondensible gas is purged from the system. The non-
condensible gas is a potential hazard for pump cavitation. Studies
should also investigate the effects of inadvertent dumping of large
quantities of cryogens into Earth's orbit. Not only the combustible
hazard, but also the pollution hazard is of concern.
Mechanical-related hazards are a significant category. Vibrations
from pumps or other sources, in tandem with normal duty cycles,
can cause serious mechanical fatigue problems of components or
structures. Another important hazard is the lock-up of the de-
ployment mechanism in either an unlatched, latched, or partially
latched position. This immediately compromises the mission
capability. Docking integrity will need to be studied thoroughly
when a docking mechanism is defined.
Pressure system integrity is critical in the cryogenic system.
Normal venting (or burping) would be made difficult if the depot
is attached to the space station. Leakage could be catastrophic
in this system. A transfer line leakage during active pumping could
cause a high overboard dump rate with propellant possibly
momentarily residing near the depot, producing a potentially
combustible situation. Uncontrolled transfer line bolloff during
transfer may cause pressure surges. A loss of pressure can lead
to low net pressure suction head to the transfer pumps. Propellant
leakage is not only a safety hazard but also a mission hazard. Small
leak rates are critical due to the time and expense needed to
launch and refuel the depot.
Cryogenic vessel overpressurization is a catastrophic hazard. An
overpressurization may be caused by a water-hammer effect
during transfer, ff a runaway pumping situation exists, then the
result could be loss of the pressure vessel. Failures in the
propellant quantity measurement device can cause the system to
be hardfilled. Ullage problems and thermal stratification may be
handled by some type of system rotational or linear acceleration
and fluid mixing. These added features introduce potential
problems, such gs overspeeding of rotational thrusters, thruster
gas impingement on the depot, oversi_eding of mixing fans, etc.
Approximately 7030 man-made objects are currently in orbit
aronnd the Earth. The majority of these tracked objects are from
spacecraft breakup or explosion. There was a 10% increase in
1987 (Johnson Space Center, 1988). The inherent hazard caused
by this situation is the problem of ancillary equipment impact.
Depot and OTV dockings are risks themselves. Although NASA has
a successful history of low-impact docking, study is needed to map
out techniques for docking and rendezvous for this configuration.
Gas impingement from the OTV on the depot would be cata-
strophic. Other impact sources are extravehicular activity (EVA)
crewmember, EVA retriever robot, tools, and any other structural
device that may be placed in this orbit. Micrometeoroids are
another evident hazard. Pressure vessels holding 200,000 lb of
oxygen and hydrogen will be very susceptible to this danger. High
pressures and large surface areas considerably increase the hazard
and risk
If a cryogenic spill does occur, care must be taken to ensure
that crewmembers do not intr(xluee contaminated EVA suits or
equipment into the space shuttle, space station, or _ Spilling
of cryogens on equipment might also damage or affect the reliable
operation of that hardware.
Electrical shocks are another hazard group. Improper electrical
design or subsystem power surges may create problems. The
danger is not only shock to personnel, but also damage or
interference to equipment. Arcing at electrical interfaces is a
potential hazard to crewmembers, and also may cause a fire or
explosion. Arcing sources can originate from a variety of foci: EVA,
OTV docking (or docking mechanisms), electric pump motors,
and instrumentation and controls. Other radio signals from nearby
orbiting spacecraft may affect delicate electronic signais.
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Operational hazards (or human factors) add to the list. The use
of incorrect procedures and ergonomically poorly designed
machinery may cause problems. Emergency evacuation (from the
depot area) options must be studied to verify that optimal per-
sonnel protection is always maintained.
CONCLUSIONS
The use of system safety techniques, applied in a carefully
designed, methodical form, is the most effective avenue to
enhanced system risk assessment and control. However, to
efficiently engender safety, an integrated system safety approach
must be used. The cryogenic propellant depot is at an optimal
point in the program for safety to become involved.
The comprehensive system safety approach requires that system
safety engineers become intimately involved in the program at all
levels. Because the cryogenic depot is now at the prephase A
conceptual stage, it is an opportune time to apply an active system
safety participation. The system safety engineer must share in the
conceptual and definition trade studies. Development of hardware,
from pathfinder prototype, and then final flight article, requires
safety cooperation.
Various technology requirements have already been identified
for the cryogenic depot program. Though the conceptual devel-
opment has not really begun, system safety can help in reviewing
and investigating each technology. The safety effort is then led
into the logical progression of technology development partici-
pation. Enhanced risk assessment requires that system safety
supports three major areas: mission, manufacturing, and perform-
ance considerations. Consideration areas must address, and safely
control such things as operational pressure, quantity measure-
ments, manufacturing requirements, and environmental condi-
tions.
System safety has well-developed and time-proven technologies
that will further good risk assessment. Different analysis methods
are applied at all stages of program development. The techniques
have been used successfully on programs in the nuclear, chemical,
and aerospace industries. Some of the appropriate methods to be
used are preliminary hazard analysis, system hazard analysis,
operating and support hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and
failure modes and effects analysis.
These safety tools will identify hazards and help categorize them
for applying the sequence of hazard control. Optimum hazard
control is through design, the least effective control is through
procedures and training. The hazard criticality, coupled with
probability of occurrence (though both may be qualitative),
betters risk assessment and control.
System safety tools are meaningless if system safety is not an
integral part of the team. The system safety engineer must be a
working member (with equal status and voice) on design,
analysis, test, manufacturing, and deployment teams. An independ-
ent system safety review panel, comprising technical experts,
should ensure the objective and autonomous verification needed
before deployment.
Although the depot is in a preconceptual phase, various generic
hazards have been identified. The significant hazard categories are
fire/explosion, environmental/thermal, mechanical, pressure, im-
pact, biological, electrical, and operational.
The above-mentioned safety techniques, applied at the appro-
pilate program phase, will explicate the hazards and verify the
controls, thereby developing a serious and comprehensive risk
assessment and control program. The cryogenic depot is replete
with inherent hazards. A safe on-orbit cryogenic depot can be
designed if an integrated system safety approach is applied.
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